Laura Farris: Clause 24 sets out the new statutory aggravating factor for murders that are connected with the end of a relationship. This provision is one of four that the Government are taking forward in response to the independent review of sentencing in cases of domestic homicide that was undertaken by Clare Wade KC. Together they will ensure that the seriousness of murder committed in a domestic context is reflected in our sentencing framework. Around a quarter of all homicides in England and Wales are classed as domestic. In other words, the perpetrator is a partner or former partner of the victim. The vast majority of these homicides are committed by men against women and usually follow a pattern of years of abuse prior to the homicide.
The legal framework for murder sentencing is contained in schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020, a piece of legislation that was first introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 20 years ago. While every case of murder carries a mandatory life sentence, this framework sets out the principles to guide the court in determining the minimum custodial term. It is a non-exhaustive list. It is always open to judges to consider aggravating and mitigating factors not contained in schedule 21.
Until now, schedule 21 has contained no express recognition of the seriousness of domestic murders, but over the past 20 years—I would argue particularly in the past five—our understanding of offending committed in a domestic context has improved. As Clare Wade highlighted in her review, our sentencing framework needs to be updated to reflect that. On the overall measures, last year, a statutory instrument was laid before Parliament to introduce both a statutory aggravating factor and a statutory mitigating factor for murder in relation to controlling or coercive behaviour, in line with the recommendations. Where an abusive partner has killed their victim, in recognition of the seriousness of the preceding abuse of coercive control and the experience of the victim before death, the coercive control will constitute an aggravating factor for the purposes of sentencing.
A new mitigating factor will apply in cases where the victim of an abusive partner or family member has killed their abuser, in recognition of their experience as a victim of abuse preceding the killing, which is exactly what happened in the Sally Challen case. This is consistent with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal—it is essentially taking the court’s conclusion and making it a statutory mitigating factor.
We have also introduced new statutory aggravating factor for murders involving gratuitous and excessive force, sometimes referred to as overkill. That is something that Clare Wade found to be strikingly prevalent in not only domestic murders, but all the cases she assessed. The perpetrator in cases of overkill—to use that shorthand—was male in all but one case.
Clause 24 introduces the fourth legislative measure that the Government committed to take forward in response to Clare Wade’s recommendations. This provision will make murders connected to the end of a relationship, or the victim’s stated intention to end a relationship, a statutory aggravating factor. In 40% of the murder cases analysed by Clare Wade as part of her review, the murder occurred at the end, or perceived end—an important qualification—of the relationship. The perpetrator was male in all those cases, and, in over two thirds of them, a history of coercive or controlling behaviour was also identified.
Killing in those circumstances is often the final controlling act of an abusive partner. As Clare Wade put it in her report, when the perpetrator learns he no longer has control over his partner because she is going to leave, the final act is homicide—the last way he can control her. The old shorthand used in court is: “If I can’t have you, no one will.” It is striking how often it twins with overkill—the use of gratuitous and excessive violence—at that moment. They often occur at the same time.
While it is for the judge to determine the appropriate weight given to the aggravating factors in each case, we expect that this change, along with the other statutory aggravating factors we have introduced in response to  Clare Wade’s recommendations, will have a significant impact on the minimum custodial terms. It will also get the court to consider the nature and context of domestic homicides specifically, which has never happened before. These changes mark a step change in the way our sentencing framework responds to and understands cases of domestic murder. For the first time, the nature of these murders and the unique harms underpinning them will be recognised expressly in our sentencing framework. The perpetrators must serve sentences that truly reflect the severity of their crimes.

Laura Farris: I align myself with the shadow Minister’s comments about the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. I would like to pick up where the shadow Minister left off, in talking about sentencing more broadly. That will bring me on, quite naturally, to the new clause concerning strangulation.
I agree with the reservation about the gendered aspect of strangulation throughout domestic abuse and particularly in domestic homicide. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley talked about the problem with the law at the   moment, where if someone takes a weapon to the scene of the crime, they get longer than if they use a weapon that, for example, comes out of the kitchen drawer. It is well known that this is the Ben Kinsella amendment, which Jack Straw introduced in 2007 in response to a campaign fought very passionately by Ben’s sister, Brooke, and his family. Ben was a young man killed in gang violence, and his sister campaigned very passionately for a 25-year starting point for anybody who takes a weapon to the scene of the crime. Clare Wade dealt with that issue quite extensively in her report. I am not expressing a view of the Government here; I am just reflecting what Clare Wade said. She was critical of the starting point. In fact, she was quite critical of starting points in general.
The Government are conducting a murder sentencing consultation at the moment. It is on the Government website, and it remains open until March this year. It addresses all these points, including where sentences do not look like they are quite right—where some are too low or too high; I am not saying that they are necessarily too high, but it is about whether starting points are right. If the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley will forgive me, I will say no to the new cause about strangulation, but I encourage her—particularly given her background and expertise—and all Members to contribute to that consultation, because we are looking at this blend of issues at the moment.
Another important concern that Clare Wade recognised in her report was about ranking methods of murder. A well-known example is that a 25-year starting point applies to any convicted offender who has taken a weapon to the scene of the crime, but a victim of domestic abuse—what we might in the old language call “the battered wife”—is almost always going to use a weapon. That is the only way a woman is likely to kill  a man, and a woman has very often taken one to the scene of the crime. We did not actually intend to capture that category of offender, but the law currently does.
We think it is important that we are not, at this point, setting one category of offence above another, and that we conduct this consultation and consider this area of the law carefully. As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley effectively acknowledged, and as I think Clare Wade also did, some issues need to be looked at in the round. I hope the hon. Lady will understand why, on that basis, I will say no to her new clause, with all due deference and respect for how she made the case so powerfully put in Clare Wade’s report. All Governments should consider it carefully. That is my first point.
The second point was about honour-based abuse, which again the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley articulated well. We are clear that we will not allow political or cultural sensitivities to get in the way of tackling it. There is no specific offence for such abuse; the term is used to encompass various offences, including not only the usual range of domestic abuse, but some of the psychological pressure that the hon. Lady described. Forced marriage can fall within that, with elements of family shame. She talked about a case with a large number of participants who were part of the abusive ring.
Honour-based abuse was considered by Clare Wade in her review, in particular in its interface with coercive and controlling behaviour. For now, the Government  are taking a view and accepting Clare Wade’s recommendation; she did not make a recommendation on anything to do with honour-based abuse, but she said that we should make coercive and controlling behaviour a statutory aggravating factor. We think that honour-based abuse falls naturally within that anyway, so we are content that that aggravating factor captures what she had in mind.
I also draw the attention of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley to the fact that our Government guidance on coercive and controlling behaviour deals with honour-based abuse. I had a look at the section last night and it is quite comprehensive. It absolutely does identify honour-based abuse as a classic example of coercive and controlling behaviour. The CPS also publishes guidance on honour-based abuse and how it falls within coercive and controlling behaviour. The domestic abuse sentencing guideline requires the court to consider the domestic context of offending behaviour, and it makes it clear that more serious and honour-based abuse is explicitly included in the guideline definition of domestic abuse.
We, too, take honour-based abuse seriously. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley knows about the national honour-based abuse phone helpline, which is run by Karma Nirvana, and the number of people it has helped under the provisions of the Domestic Abuse Act—more than 2,500 people in the past year. The Home Office funds that. We therefore have a commitment to honour-based abuse, but are for now satisfied that it is captured by the coercive and controlling aggravating factor. For that reason, we will not accept her new clause 27.
Finally, on new clause 29, I did some work on this last night, and it is the only one where I disagree with the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. In arguing for her new clause, she said that no defence to murder should be based solely on the infidelity of the victim. I did some research on this—let me just dig out the statute. The issue was dealt with by the last Labour Government under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. I checked that with the Mother of the House, the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), because I detected her influence on the provisions. She said that she had some involvement.
The 2009 Act repealed the defence of provocation, and replaced it with the partial defence of loss of control. Within that it removed an act of revenge from being any argument that could be advanced. Section 55(6) removed the possibility of advancing infidelity as a defence in a murder case. On that basis, I was satisfied that it was on the statute book. I also checked with officials whether there was any recent example of such a defence ever being advanced or being successful as such, but we could not find one. We are therefore satisfied that the law as it stands provides sufficient protection.